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  We study the process of corporate restructuring for a sample of 298 firms during 
the 1989-98 period that announce that they are considering restructuring alternatives. We 
find that restructuring is a lengthy process, with the majority of the restructuring period 
occurring prior to any definitive proposals for corporate change. Only 70 percent of the 
firms that initially propose restructuring later make a definitive proposal to sell either all 
or part of the firm, with other firms taking themselves out of play or declaring 
bankruptcy. Hence, the market reaction to the initial restructuring announcement 
underestimates the full wealth effects of completed restructurings. The estimate of the 
full value of restructuring across the sample firms averages 7.5 percent, with the greatest 
gains of 30 percent accruing to firms that are acquired. The average gain for the full 
restructuring period for firms divesting a unit is 5 percent, which is roughly double that 
estimated for the initial announcement in prior studies of corporate divestitures.  1
Valuing the Process of Corporate Restructuring 
 
1. Introduction 
  In this paper, we provide new estimates of the value of corporate restructuring. 
Our main contribution is to value the complete process of corporate restructuring on an 
ex-ante basis, rather than on an ex-post basis as is done in most event studies. We study 
298 firms from the 1989-1998 period that announce that they are considering 
restructuring alternatives. We then track the nature and effect of subsequent restructuring 
decisions. Our experimental design enables a more accurate estimate of the wealth gains 
from restructuring. Our procedure also better captures the process of corporate 
restructuring by including failed restructuring attempts; indeed, as we report below, 30 
percent of the firms that initially contemplate restructuring fail to follow-up with a 
definitive restructuring action. 
  Our sampling procedure and estimation method differ from the standard analysis 
of corporate restructuring decisions. In the typical event study, a data set of completed 
transactions of a particular type (e.g., spinoff, carveout, or acquisition) is gathered from 
sources such as SEC documents, financial publications such as Mergers and Acquisitions, 
or vendors such as Securities Data Corporation. Media sources such as the Wall Street 
Journal and Lexis/Nexis are then used to determine the initial public announcement date 
of the particular event. The wealth effects of the particular restructuring event are then 
estimated by computing abnormal returns around the initial announcement date.
1 
                                                           
1 See Appendix A for selected event studies of corporate restructuring. For a survey of past work and for 
recent evidence from the 1990s, see Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001) and Mulherin & Boone (2000).   2
  As noted by Fama (1991), the pinpointing of event studies on narrow windows 
around the initial announcement has many methodological benefits. In particular, the 
standard event-study procedure attenuates the joint-hypothesis problem, as the results 
from narrow windows are much less sensitive to a particular asset-pricing model. (See, 
also, Mitchell & Stafford (2000).) 
  Although offering methodological purity, the typical event study does not provide 
a complete picture of corporate restructuring. For one, many formal restructuring 
decisions are partially anticipated (Malatesta & Thompson (1985)). Moreover, because 
not all proposed restructurings come to fruition, the initial price reaction to the 
announcement underestimates the wealth effects of completed corporate actions. More 
generally, the emphasis on the initial announcement date underplays the complexities of 
the corporate restructuring process. 
  The incomplete nature of the typical event study has been noted in a few 
empirical studies of particular restructuring events. In their study of spinoffs, Copeland, 
Lemgruber & Mayers (1987) find that a non-trivial fraction of proposed spinoffs are not 
completed. For their sample, they document that the abnormal return at the 
announcement date underestimates the full wealth effects for the completed spinoffs and 
that the news of the cancelled spinoffs causes a downward wealth revision (although the 
small sample size affects the statistical significance of the estimates). In their study of 
successful and unsuccessful asset sales, Hite, Owers & Rogers (1987) find that 
unsuccessful asset sales give up their initial wealth gains. Both of these studies, however, 
only focus on a particular restructuring event and thereby do not capture the full richness 
of the corporate restructuring process.   3
  Determining the full valuation of corporate restructuring is quite important for 
distinguishing theories in corporate finance. A prime example is provided in Bradley, 
Desai & Kim (1983). They address why targets in unsuccessful acquisitions experience 
abnormal wealth gains. Their finding that the wealth gains are contingent on a subsequent 
successful acquisition is supportive of a synergy explanation rather than an information 
rationale. 
  In this paper, we analyze the full value of corporate restructuring. Our underlying 
premise is that corporate restructuring is a lengthy process whereby companies 
sequentially (1) make a general decision to restructure, (2) adopt a particular restructuring 
strategy, and (3) decide whether to complete the chosen strategy. Rather than focus 
analysis on completed restructurings of a particular type, we instead begin with a set of 
firms that announce that they are considering restructuring. We provide evidence on the 
length of time entailed by each component of the restructuring sequence. We confirm that 
restructuring is a lengthy process. Indeed, we find that the majority of the restructuring 
period occurs prior to the announcement of any formal restructuring decision. 
We then estimate the wealth effects of each stage of the restructuring process, 
allowing us to better gauge the valuation effects of corporate restructuring. Our 
experimental design remains true to the standard event study procedure by performing 
estimates around narrow periods surrounding key restructuring dates. Because our sample 
includes a variety of restructuring outcomes, we can better distinguish the source of 
wealth gains from restructuring. 
  Our research is in the spirit of the conditional event study literature (see, e.g., 
Eckbo, Maksimovic & Williams (1990)) which notes that the market reaction to any   4
announcement only captures the surprise content of the announcement. By studying both 
broad and specific proposals to restructure, our estimation method more fully captures the 
total value of the restructuring process. Moreover, our experimental design follows the 
approach suggested by Prabhala (1997) by comparing firms that actually undergo 
restructuring with those that choose not to restructure. 
  Our multi-stage analysis of restructuring decisions is also pertinent to policy 
debates regarding the source of price movements prior to formal restructuring 
announcements. As discussed by Jarrell & Poulsen (1989) and Schwert (1996), a concern 
of securities regulators is that the price run-up prior to restructuring proposals such as 
mergers may reflect insider trading. Our analysis suggests, by contrast, that much of the 
price appreciation prior to a formal restructuring proposal stems from initial, tentative 
statements that a firm is considering restructuring. 
  The following section describes the creation of the sample. Section 3 reports 
information on the length of the restructuring period for the sample firms. Section 4 
reports the estimates of the wealth effects at the various stages of the restructuring 
process. The final section offers a summary and concluding comments that include 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Sample Description 
  Our interest is to study a sample of firms that announced that they are considering 
restructuring and then to determine the nature and extent to which actual restructuring 
occurs. The analysis includes firms that consider the sale of the entire corporation as well 
as firms that consider the possible restructuring of a specific division. Our study consists   5
of firms making initial announcements in the ten-year period from 1989 to 1998. The 
ending year of 1998 enables some time for restructuring to occur after the initial 
announcement. 
  To form our sample, we employ keyword searches on Lexis/Nexis and manual 
searches of the Wall Street Journal Index. On Lexis/Nexis, we focus on firms that 
announced that they were evaluating "strategic options" or "strategic alternatives." In the 
Wall Street Journal Index, we search the "Divestiture" section for firms that announced 
that they were considering restructuring. After our initial search, we eliminate privately- 
held entities and non-U.S. firms by requiring that the firm's common stock be listed in the 
Daily Stock Price Record at the time of the initial announcement. 
  These searches produced a sample of 298 firms from the 1989-1998 period. 
Within this full sample, 132 (44 percent) of the firms were listed on the NYSE at the time 
of the initial announcement, 140 (47 percent) were listed on NASDAQ, and 26 (9 
percent) were listed on the AMEX. 
  Table 1 describes the content of the initial announcements of the 298 sample 
firms. The initial announcements can be grouped into four mutually exclusive categories. 
Thirty-three of the firms (11 percent) announced that they were considering restructuring 
after a prior control or governance activity such as an uncompleted merger or a proxy 
contest. Ninety-seven firms (33 percent) announced that the potential restructuring 
included the possible sale of the entire corporation. Seventy-five firms (25 percent) made 
a broad statement that they were considering a general restructuring. Finally, ninety-three 
firms (31 percent) announced that they were evaluating the restructuring of a particular   6
division. Appendix B provides a specific example of each of these four categories of 
initial restructuring announcements. 
  Table 2 reports the distribution of the initial announcements across the 1989-1998 
period. Given the 298 sample firms in the ten-year period, there are roughly 30 
observations per year. The annual number of observations ranges from 20 in 1989 to 52 
in 1998. 
  For each of the sample firms, we track whether they actually do restructure in the 
period following the initial announcement. We determine whether they (a) reach an 
intermediate stage of a formal agreement to sell all or part of the firm and (b) complete 
the planned restructuring. 
  Table 3 reports the distribution of the sample based on whether the firms reach an 
intermediate agreement to sell all or part of the firm. Eighty-nine firms (29.9 percent) that 
initially announce a potential restructuring do not make an intermediate announcement of 
a restructuring agreement. Ninety-seven of the firms (32.6 percent) make an intermediate 
announcement that they have received a formal acquisition offer. One hundred twelve 
firms (37.6 percent) announce that they have reached an agreement to sell a specific 
division. In total, 70 percent of the sample firms that initially announce that they are 
considering restructuring later announce an actual restructuring proposal. Appendix B 
provides a specific example of each of these three categories of intermediate restructuring 
announcements. 
  Table 4 reports the distribution of the sample based on the completion of 
restructuring. Thirty-four (11.4 percent) of the sample firms that initially announce that 
they are considering restructuring make no subsequent announcement pertinent to the   7
restructuring. Thirty-six firms (12.1 percent) announce the completion of the potential 
restructuring by announcing that they are no longer for sale. Fifteen firms (5 percent) 
announce an unsuccessful restructuring, defined as cancelled agreements to sell all or part 
of the firm: twelve entail withdrawn takeovers and three entail withdrawn divestitures. 
Eighty-five firms (28.5 percent) are acquired. One hundred nine firms (36.6 percent) 
engage in a divestiture.
2 Finally, nineteen firms (6.4 percent) file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. Appendix B provides a specific example of each of these six categories of 
completion announcement.
3 
  As a final general characterization of the sample, Table 5 reports the interaction of 
the Initial Announcement category with the Event Completion category. Panel A reports 
the number of observations in each cross category. Virtually all of the cells are non-zero, 
indicating substantial breadth in the intersection between the Initial Announcement 
category and the Event Completion category. 
  Panel B of Table 5 reports the interaction of the two categories based on the 
Initial Announcement. The data indicate that the nature of the Initial Announcement 
maps into takeover likelihood. More than half of the firms that propose restructuring after 
prior control or governance activity are later acquired. Similarly, roughly 50 percent of 
the firms that indicate that restructuring could include the possible sale of the entire 
corporation are subsequently acquired. By contrast, a smaller fraction, 29 percent, of the 
firms that make a more general restructuring statement are subsequently taken over; 
                                                           
2 The 109 divestitures include 10 spinoffs, 6 equity carveouts, 73 assets sales, and 20 divestiture programs, 
defined as sales of multiple divisions. 
3 Note that, by construction, the 209 firms that make an intermediate announcement map into the 209 firms 
that are in an unsuccessful acquisition (15), are acquired (85), or engage in a divestiture (109).   8
indeed, roughly one quarter of the firms that merely make a broad restructuring proposal 
never report any subsequent actions regarding restructuring. 
  As shown in the last row of Panel B of Table 5, the firms that initially propose the 
restructuring of a specific division have a different pattern of outcomes than the other 
three Initial Announcement categories. The better part, 88 percent, of this Specific 
Division group actually divest the subject division. This rate of divestiture is similar to 
prior studies of specific types of divestitures. Copeland, Lemgruber & Mayers (1987) 
report that 65 of 73 firms (89 percent) that announce a spinoff actually complete the 
divestiture. Similarly, Schipper & Smith (1986) report that 68 of 76 equity carveouts 
(89.5 percent) that are initially announced are later completed. 
  The interaction of the two categories based on Event Completion, reported in 
Panel C of Table 5, also provides predictable relations. For example, half of the firms 
with no completion announcement had initially made a fairly broad statement on the 
intent to restructure. Similarly, 53 percent of the firms that are acquired had initially 
stated that the proposed restructuring included the possible sale of the entire corporation. 
Finally, 75 percent of the firms that divest a unit had initially focused the restructuring 
effort on a specific division. 
  As a whole, this initial characterization of the sample reveals that the proposal of 
a corporate restructuring can lead to a variety of outcomes. These outcomes range from 
being acquired, to severing a division, to declaring bankruptcy, to doing nothing at all. To 
provide additional detail on the process of restructuring of the sample firms, the 
following section reports information on the length of the restructuring period. 
   9
3. Length of the Restructuring Period 
  Table 6 reports data on the length of time that it takes for the sample firms to 
restructure. Information is presented for three intervals: (1) initial announcement to 
intermediate announcement, (2) intermediate announcement to event completion, and (3) 
the full restructuring period from initial announcement to event completion. For each 
interval, the mean and median number of calendar days are reported, as well as the 
number of observations for the given interval. Note that the number of observations for 
particular intervals is less than the full sample of 298 firms, because 89 firms do not 
make an intermediate announcement and 34 firms do not have an event completion 
announcement. 
  Data for the full sample is presented in Panel A of Table 6. The average 
restructuring takes 343 calendar days, or roughly one year. The median restructuring 
period is 281 days, which is smaller than the mean due to some exceptionally lengthy 
restructuring events. 
  For the 209 firms with an intermediate announcement, the data indicate that the 
period between the initial announcement and the intermediate announcement comprises 
the majority of the restructuring period. On average, firms announce a potential 
restructuring roughly 200 days before a specific restructuring action is proposed. The 
period between the intermediate restructuring announcement and event completion 
averages another 150 days. 
  The pattern of the restructuring intervals is similar across the various categories of 
restructuring announcements. Panel B of Table 6 reports the data for the four types of 
initial announcements. For each category, restructuring takes more than 300 calendar   10
days. Moreover, the interval between the initial and intermediate announcements is 
longer than the interval between the intermediate announcement and event completion. 
  Panel C of Table 6 reports the length of the restructuring period for the five 
categories of the event outcome. The shortest period is for the 36 firms that conclude the 
event by stating they are no longer for sale. The longest period is for the 15 firms that are 
the target of an unsuccessful acquisition. 
  In general, the data indicate that restructuring is a lengthy process. Moreover, the 
process begins well before the firms announce a specific restructuring proposal. The 
following section reports estimates of the magnitude and the timing of the wealth changes 
associated with the restructuring process. 
 
4. The Wealth Effects of Corporate Restructuring 
  In this section we estimate the value of the corporate restructuring process. We 
focus on the wealth changes for the sample firms at the three key stages of restructuring: 
the initial restructuring announcement, the intermediate announcement, and the event 
completion. Our analysis addresses the following three questions: 
1.  Do any or all of the three events convey information? 
2.  What is the magnitude of the initial versus the intermediate announcement? 
3.  What is the value change for the entire restructuring process? 
 
The first query explores the manner in which statements by management convey 
information to the market. Do initial, and sometimes broad, announcements by 
management credibly reveal information? One reason that mere pronouncements by   11
management may convey information is that false statements are subject to legal action.
4 
Moreover, the initial restructuring announcements are often made under advisement by 
investment banks whose reputation is affected by their clients' performance. Finally, an 
announcement of a potential restructuring is likely to draw greater scrutiny of a firm; if 
the firm fails to take constructive action, the market could enforce a signaling equilibrium 
by penalizing shareholders via a price decline and management via executive turnover. 
  The second question considers one measure of the degree to which the standard 
event-study procedure underestimates the wealth effects of corporate restructuring. 
Because not all initial restructuring announcements are followed by actual corporate 
actions, the initial announcement is not likely to capture the full wealth effect of the 
restructuring. Our analysis gauges the magnitude of the underestimation. 
  The third question more broadly values the restructuring process. This valuation 
provides another estimate of the wealth enhancement of completed restructurings. 
Moreover, a treatment of the entire process also clarifies how the market responds to 
withdrawn or failed restructuring attempts. In particular, do firms that unsuccessfully 
restructure give up any initial wealth gains? Indeed, might firms that are unable to 
restructure end up worse off than their pre-restructuring value? 
  At each of the three restructuring stages, we employ event-study techniques to 
gauge the wealth effects of restructuring. For each announcement, we estimate abnormal 
returns for three windows: (-1,+1), (-5,+5), and (-20,+20), where day 0 is the date of a 
particular announcement as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. 
The narrow window pinpoints the specific wealth effect of the announcement. The longer 
                                                           
4 For an analysis of the effect of the legal regime on communication, see Forsythe, Lundholm and Rietz 
(1999).   12
windows account for the fact that any one announcement is often only part of a 
heightened stream of information about the restructuring firms. 
  As our estimates of the wealth effects of restructuring, we report buy-and-hold 
returns. These estimates are calculated as:  
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1  and N is the number of firms in the sample. In our analysis, we use 
the CRSP value-weighted index as the market benchmark. 
 
In unreported results, we also estimate net-of-market, cumulative abnormal 
returns. These returns are calculated as:  
t m t i t i R R AR , , , − =   
where t i R , is the return on Firm i at time t and  t m R , is the contemporaneous return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index. The cumulative abnormal returns for each firm is calculated 
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1  where N is the number of firms in the sample. 
We choose to report the buy-and-hold returns because of the upward bias in 
CARs caused by bid-ask spread bounce and because the simple summing of daily returns 
can produce cases of non-realistic returns of less then -100 percent for a given event 
interval.
5 In results available upon request, we find virtually no difference at all for 
                                                           
5 As a simple example, a price series of 20, 10, 5, and 4 over a four-day period generates a summed return 
of -120 percent.   13
estimates for the full sample. There are some slight qualitative differences in some cases 
where the sample is stratified, since some of the sub-samples have less than 20 
observations. However, consistent with Fama's (1991) observations about event studies, 
the choice of estimation method does not alter the inferences from our reported results. 
 
A.  Wealth Effects at Individual Announcement Dates 
A.1. Wealth Effects at the Initial Restructuring Announcement 
Table 7 reports the wealth changes at the initial announcement of corporate 
restructuring. The results are reported for both the full sample of 298 firms, as well as for 
sub-samples based on the initial announcement categories. 
  As reported in Panel A of Table 7, the initial restructuring announcement is, on 
average, associated with an increase in shareholder wealth. For the (-1,+1) window, the 
average firm appreciates 6.4 percent, net of market movements. The wealth changes in 
the longer windows are comparable, indicating that the reported announcement date 
pinpoints the initial market reaction to the proposed restructuring. 
  The evidence in Panel B of Table 7 suggests that takeover anticipation is a prime 
source of the positive reaction to the initial restructuring announcement. The largest gains 
of 12 percent accrue to the sub-sample of 97 firms whose restructuring announcement 
includes the statement that the firm is considering a possible sale of the entire 
corporation. Firms previously engaged in corporate control activity also experience 
above-average abnormal returns. Recall from Table 5 that roughly half of the firms in 
these two categories are later acquired.    14
By contrast, firms considering the restructuring of a specific division have a 
smaller stock price reaction at the initial announcement. The estimated abnormal return in 
the (-1,+1) window is 3 percent, which is comparable in magnitude to results from prior 
event studies of corporate divestitures. The sub-sample of firms that merely propose a 
general restructuring have the smallest abnormal returns; moreover, the estimated returns 
for this sub-sample are less than two standard deviations from zero. 
As a summary of the results, Figure 1 reports the cumulative abnormal return for 
each of the four categories in the (-60,+60) period around the initial announcement. The 
figure confirms the positive returns at announcement for each category.  
  In general, the results in Table 7 and Figure 1 indicate that the market responds 
favorably to proposed restructurings. The content of the announcement appears to matter, 
in part because the nature of the announcement maps into takeover anticipations. The 
next section compares the initial, often broad, restructuring announcements to subsequent 
intermediate announcements that represent more definitive restructuring actions. 
A.2. Wealth Effects at the Intermediate Restructuring Announcement 
Table 8 reports the wealth effects at the intermediate restructuring announcement 
date. Data are available for 208 firms that announce that they are the object of a formal 
acquisition offer or that have a definitive proposal to sell a division. (One of the 209 
firms with an intermediate announcement is unavailable because the firm delists prior to 
the intermediate announcement.) 
  Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for the full sample of 208 firms. As 
indicated for the (-1,+1) window, the average firm appreciates 5 percent at the 
intermediate announcement. The longer windows have slightly larger appreciation,   15
possibly due to additional information being released in days surrounding the 
intermediate announcement. 
  As reported in Panel B of Table 8, the bulk of the wealth appreciation at the 
intermediate announcement is driven by the firms that are the object of an acquisition. In 
the three days surrounding the intermediate announcement, the abnormal return is 
roughly 10 percent. For the longer window, (-20,+20), the wealth appreciation is nearly 
15 percent. 
  The results for the intermediate announcement date are summarized in Figure 2. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Schwert (1996)), the firms subject to a formal 
acquisition offer accrue a run-up prior to the announcement and a further appreciation at 
announcement. The firms announcing a divestiture experience similar patterns, although 
of a smaller order of magnitude. 
A.3. Wealth Effects at Event Completion 
As a final measure of the wealth effects on the specific announcement dates, Table 9 
reports the abnormal returns surrounding the date of event completion. Data are available 
for 257 firms. (Of the full sample of 298 firms, 34 do not have an event completion 
announcement, 1 delists prior to the intermediate announcement, and 6 delist prior to 
announcing bankruptcy.) 
Panel A of Table 9 indicates that there is an average negative price reaction at event 
completion. For the (-1,+1) window, firm value falls by 3.77 percent, with larger declines 
for the longer event windows. 
  Panel B of Table 9 indicates that the negative returns at event completion are 
associated with firms that do not successfully restructure. These firms include those that   16
state they are no longer for sale, that are the object of a failed takeover, and that declare 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. For these categories of firms, the end of the restructuring process 
conveys negative information. In results not reported in the table, but available upon 
request, we find that the bulk of the price decline for these categories occurs in the period 
leading up to event completion. For the (-20,+1) period around event completion, the 
mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is -17.2 percent for the No Longer for Sale category, 
-24.8 percent for the Unsuccessful Acquisition category, and -52.7 percent for the 
Bankruptcy category. 
  The firms that undertake a restructuring action, either by being acquired or by 
divesting a unit, have virtually no observable wealth changes at event completion. This is 
due mostly to sample design. The completion date for successful restructurings is defined 
as the end of the process, and thereby reveals little or no new information. 
  A.4. Summary of the Individual Event Analysis 
  The analysis of the three different restructuring announcements indicates that 
information is conveyed at each stage of the restructuring process. The information flow 
and the associated market valuation follow a straightforward process. Both the initial and 
intermediate stages of restructuring are viewed favorably by the market, with the greatest 
wealth appreciation borne by the firms that become objects of an acquisition. Firms that 
take themselves out of play or that end the restructuring by declaring bankruptcy suffer 
wealth reversals. The next section begins the analysis of the interplay between the 
different stages of restructuring by estimating the combined wealth effects of the initial 
and intermediate restructuring decisions. 
   17
B.  Combined Wealth Effects for the Initial and Intermediate Announcements 
This section reports estimates of the combined wealth effects of the initial and 
intermediate restructuring announcements. The wealth effects are estimated by summing 
by firm the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the two dates. Because not all firms 
complete a restructuring, the combined returns provide a better estimate of the wealth 
effects of completed corporate restructurings. Data are available for 208 firms that make 
both an initial and intermediate restructuring announcement. 
  Panel A of Table 10 reports the results for the full sample of 208 firms. For the 
narrow (-1,+1) window, the average firm appreciates by roughly 13 percent for the two 
dates. The abnormal returns are somewhat larger for the longer event windows. The 
wealth appreciation reported for the combined events is roughly double that for the initial 
announcement, reflecting the results in Table 7 and Table 8 that both the initial and 
intermediate announcements convey information. 
  Panel B of Table 10 reports the combined wealth effects by initial announcement 
categories. The ordinal ranking of the results by category to a great extent reflect the 
findings in Table 5 on acquisition likelihood. The greatest wealth effects accrue to the 
firms that had prior activity or that announced that they are in play. The lowest combined 
returns are for firms that focus restructuring on a specific division and do not put the 
entire firm on the block. 
  Panel C of Table 10 reports the combined returns by intermediate category. This 
stratification also indicates that acquisition offers drive much of the combined wealth 
appreciation. However, the combined wealth effects for firms divesting units is also non-  18
trivial. The sum of the abnormal returns in the three-day period around the two 
announcements is roughly 5 percent. 
 
C.  The Full Value of Corporate Restructuring 
As an estimate of the full value of corporate restructuring, Table 11 reports the 
combined wealth effects for the three segments of the corporate restructuring process: 
initial announcement, intermediate announcement, and event completion. The wealth 
effects are estimated by summing by firm the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the three 
dates. For firms in the "no longer for sale" and "bankruptcy" categories, the estimates 
reflect only two dates: the initial announcement and event completion. Note that data are 
unavailable for the 6 firms that delist prior to announcing bankruptcy. 
  Panel A of Table 11 reports the estimates of the full value of restructuring for the 
full sample. The results indicate that, on average, restructuring increases shareholder 
wealth. For both the (-1,+1) and (-5,+5) windows, the abnormal returns average between 
7 and 8 percent. Note that the (-20,+20) value is smaller, in part due to large negatives for 
the bankruptcy sub-sample discussed below. 
  Panel B of Table 11 reports the results by event completion category. Firms with 
successful restructurings garner positive and significant wealth changes. Firms that are 
acquired have the largest wealth appreciation, on the order of 30 percent. Firms that 
divest units also experience positive, yet smaller, wealth gains. 
  As also reported in panel B, firms that unsuccessfully restructure do not 
experience improvements in shareholder wealth. Firms that announce that they are no 
longer for sale have negative values for the entire restructuring period, although the   19
values are less than two standard deviations from zero. Firms that are the object of an 
unsuccessful acquisition also give up any gains experienced initially in the restructuring 
process. 
  On an ex-post basis, the biggest losers in the restructuring process are the firms 
that end the process by declaring bankruptcy. Across all three event windows, the 
bankruptcy sub-sample has negative and significant abnormal returns. For the (-20,+20) 
window, the mean loss in wealth is 78.13 percent. Note that because the results in Table 
11 sum across the Initial, Intermediate and Completion events, the median loss in wealth 
for the Bakruptcy category is actually less than -100 percent. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  In this paper we study the process of corporate restructuring. We construct a 
sample of 298 firms from the 1989-98 period that initially announce that they are 
considering restructuring alternatives. We then track the intermediate and completion 
stages of the restructuring process for the sample firms. 
  We find that restructuring is a lengthy process. The average firm takes roughly 
one year to complete restructuring actions. The majority of this period occurs prior to any 
definitive restructuring actions such as the sale of all or part of the firm. We also find that 
the initial restructuring proposals are followed by a variety of outcomes ranging from 
being acquired, to declaring bankruptcy, to taking no observable actions. 
  We value the restructuring process by estimating the wealth effects at each stage 
of the restructuring process. The initial restructuring announcement, on average, is 
associated with positive stock price appreciation, reflecting in part takeover anticipation.   20
Subsequent announcements on definitive restructuring actions such the sale of all or part 
of the firm have further positive effects on shareholder wealth. Hence, the initial 
restructuring announcement underestimates the wealth effects of completed 
restructurings. 
  Our research method enables us to estimate the full value of restructuring across 
the entire restructuring period and to compare the valuation effects across event 
outcomes. The estimate of the full value of restructuring across the sample firms averages 
7.5 percent, with the greatest gains going to firms that are acquired. The average gain for 
the full restructuring period for firms divesting a unit is 5 percent, which is roughly 
double that reported in prior studies of the initial announcement date. Firms that take 
themselves out of play give up any initial wealth gains. Firms that end the restructuring 
process by declaring bankruptcy suffer a large, significant decline in wealth. 
  Our analysis suggests several interesting avenues for future research. The time 
period for our analysis, 1989-1998, has been a decade of generally favorable economic 
conditions. As data become available, it would be productive to extend the sample to the 
more recent years that have entailed a downward direction in market performance. Given 
results in work such as Mitchell & Pulvino (2001), one might expect an incidence of 
uncompleted restructuring that exceeds the 30 percent rate in our sample. 
  A related extension would be to study the extent to which the form of the 
restructuring decision varies over time. Jain (1985) suggests that the choice between, say, 
an asset sale or a spinoff, is affected by market conditions. The extension of our 
experimental design to recent years would enable a direct test of this conjecture.   21
  Finally, our multi-stage sample of restructuring could be used to address the 
interaction between corporate restructuring and corporate governance. For example, what 
is the causal relation between restructuring and management turnover? Does a CEO who 
implements restructuring maintain job stability, or, instead, does a change in the CEO 
provide the actual impetus for any forthcoming corporate change? The answers to these 
important questions can be more clearly discerned by a sampling and estimation 
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Appendix B. Examples of the Initial Announcements, Intermediate Events, and 
Event Completion. This appendix provides examples for each category of Initial 
Announcement, Intermediate Event, and Event Completion. Details for each example 





1. Prior  Activity 
 
Napa Valley Bancorp. On April 1, 1991, Napa announced that it had asked outside 
investment counsel to review and analyze various options for maximizing shareholder 
value. The action came after Napa's board had rejected an acquisition offer by 
Westamerica Bancorporation. Subsequently, on March 16, 1992, Westamerica made 
another unsolicited bid for Napa. After negotiation, the merger was effected on April 15, 
1993. 
 
2. Possible  Sale 
 
Belding Heminway Company. On February 14, 1992, Belding announced that it would 
explore alternatives to maximize shareholder value, including a possible merger or sale of 
the company. On January 5, 1993, Belding announced that it had received an acquisition 
proposal from Noel Group, Inc. The acquisition was completed on July 21, 1993. 
 
3. General  Restructuring 
 
CompuChem Corp. On April 22, 1991, CompuChem announced that it had engaged 
Kidder Peabody to advise on strategic alternatives to improve shareholder value. On 
November 25, 1991, CompuChem signed a definitive merger agreement with Roche 
Biomedical Laboratories. The merger was approved on February 11, 1992. 
 
4. Specific  Division 
 
Clark Equipment Co. On November 4, 1991, Clark announced that it had retained First 
Boston Corp. to assist in exploring strategic options for its forklift business, Clark 
Material Handling Co. On May 28, 1992, Clark announced that it had reached a 
definitive agreement to sell the business to Terex Corp. The sale of the division was 
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Intermediate Announcement 
 
1.  No Intermediate Announcement 
 
Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. On October 13, 1993, Gerrity announced that it had retained 
Goldman Sachs to explore strategic alternatives, including the sale of assets through a 
royalty trust or a possible sale of the company. No specific action occurred, and on 
January 6, 1994, the company terminated the process of seeking potential buyers. 
 
2. Acquisition  Offer 
 
Sterling Chemicals. On January 29, 1996, Sterling announced that it was exploring 
strategic alternatives to enhance stockholder value, including the possible sale of the 
company. On April 23, 1996, Sterling received offers from Hunstman Corp and from a 
leveraged buyout firm. Sterling agreed to the leveraged buyout, which was completed on 
August 22, 1996. 
 
3.  To Divest Unit 
 
Pentair Inc. On September 6, 1994, Pentair announced that it had retained CS First 
Boston to explore strategic alternatives for its paper businesses. On February, 22, 1995, 
the announced an agreement to sell its Cross Pointe division, consistent with its plans in 
September 1994. On June 30, 1995, Pentair completed the sale of its remaining paper 
assets. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Event Completion 
 
1.  No Completion Announcement 
 
HemaCare Corp. On October 20, 1993, HemaCare announced the retention of Kemper 
Securities to pursue strategic alternatives for the company. No substantive actions were 
undertaken following this announcement. 
 
2.  No Longer for Sale 
 
Tambrands Inc. On June 21, 1993, the Wall Street Journal reported that Tambrands was 
exploring a possible sale of the company. Although there were rumors of possible 
bidders, no acquisition offer arose. On September 20, 1993, Tambrands announced that it 
would instead remain as an independent entity. 
 
3. Unsuccessful  Acquisition 
 
Lillian Vernon Corp. On March 10, 1995, Lillian Vernon announced that it was exploring 
strategic alternatives, including a sale of the company. On June 14, 1995, the company 
announced a definitive agreement to be acquired by Freeman Spogli & Co. However, on 




MicroProse Inc. On May 19, 1998, MicroProse announced that its Board of Directors had 
authorized management to investigate strategic alternatives for the company. On August 
12, 1998, MicroProse announced a definitive agreement to be acquired by Hasbro. The 
tender offer was completed on September 15, 1998. 
 
5. Divested  Unit 
 
Northern States Power Co. On March 20, 1990, Northern States announced that it was 
considering selling its Minot Telephone Co. Subsidiary, and that it had hired Kidder 
Peabody to assist in the possible sale. On June 1, 1990, Northern States announced the 
signing of a definitive agreement to sell Minot to Rochester Telephone Corp. The sale 




Planet Hollywood International Inc. On July 21, 1998, Planet Hollywood announced that 
it had retained Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns to evaluate and seek strategic 
alternatives. The company continued to experience loses and filed for Chapter 11 on 
August 17, 1999. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2. Sample by Year of Initial Announcement. This table reports the distribution 
of the sample of 298 firms across the 1989-1998 period by the year of the initial 
restructuring announcement. The sample was formed via keyword searches on 
Lexis/Nexis (electronically) and the "Divestiture" section of the Wall Street Journal 
Index (manually) for firms announcing that they were evaluating "strategic alternatives" 
or "strategic options", or made related statements of potential restructuring. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year    Number of Observations    Fraction of the sample 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1989    20      6.7% 
 
1990    24      8.1% 
 
1991    34      11.4% 
 
1992    24      8.1% 
 
1993    28      9.4% 
 
1994    23      7.7% 
 
1995    33      11.1% 
 
1996    38      12.8% 
 
1997    22      7.4% 
 
1998    52      17.4% 
 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. Length of the Restructuring Period. This table reports the mean (median) length of 
time, in calendar days, of the restructuring periods for the sample firms. Note that 89 firms do not 
have an intermediate announcement and 34 firms do not have an event completion. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Initial  to  Intermediate   Initial  to   
Sample     Intermediate   to  Completion   Complete 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
 
Full  Sample    206  (141)   150  (120)   343  (281) 
    N=209    N=209    N=264 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Initial Announcement 
 
Prior  Activity    218  (97)  179  (156)   391  (306) 
    N=22    N=22    N=29 
 
Possible  Sale    212  (139)   165  (145)   333  (280) 
    N=57    N=57    N=89 
 
General Restructuring    235 (172)    162 (133)    376 (319) 
    N=47    N=47    N=58 
 
Specific Division    183 (140)    125 (98)    315 (256) 
    N=83    N=83    N=88 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C. Categorized by Event Completion 
 
No  Longer  for  Sale   n.a.    n.a.    256  (220) 
          N = 3 6    
 
Unsuccessful Acquisition  223 (175)    153 (97)    433 (380) 
    N=15    N=15    N=15 
 
Acquired    197  (119)   178  (156)   376  (309) 
    N=85    N=85    N=85 
 
Divested  Unit    203  (150)   127  (100)   330  (273) 
    N=109    N=109    N=109 
 
Bankruptcy    n.a.    n.a.    362  (361) 
         N = 1 9  
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Table 7. Wealth Effects at the Initial Restructuring Announcement. This table 
reports the wealth effects at the initial announcement of corporate restructuring for the 
298 sample firms. Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B reports results for 
the four categories of initial announcements. Sample formation and announcement 
categories are described in Table 1. The wealth effects are estimated with net-of-market 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the CRSP value-weighted 
index. The estimates are provided for three event windows: (-1,+1), (-5+5) and (-20,+20), 
where day zero is the date of the initial announcement of the restructuring as determined 
from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are mean (p-value 
of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return equals zero) 
and median (p-value of a signed-rank test). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
Sample  (-1,+1)    (-5,+5)    (-20,+20) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample  [N=298] 
 
Mean   6.40%  (<.001)   7.08%  (<.001)   5.39%  (0.002) 
Median  3.55% (<.001)    4.22% (<.001)    3.93% (0.001) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Initial Announcement 
 
 
Prior  Activity   6.88%  (0.011)   6.91%  (0.005)   8.94%  (0.077) 
[N=33]    1.83%  (0.015)   2.05%  (0.005)   7.67%  (0.069) 
 
 
Possible Sale    12.16% (<.001)  13.77% (<.001)  11.45% (<.001) 
[N=97]      11.36% (<.001)  10.76% (<.001)  13.27% (<.001) 
 
 
General Restructuring 2.93% (0.138)   2.74% (0.251)   -0.36% (0.925) 
[N=75]    2.23%  (0.053)   3.52%  (0.209)   -5.10%  (0.730) 
 
 
Specific Division  3.03% (<.001)   3.65% (<.001)   2.44% (0.192) 
[N=93]    1.26%  (<.001)   2.67%  (<.001)   0.23%  (0.368) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8. Wealth Effects at the Intermediate Restructuring Announcement. This table 
reports the wealth effects at the intermediate announcement of corporate restructuring. 
Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B reports results for the two categories 
of intermediate announcements. Sample formation and announcement categories are 
described in Table 3. Note that one firm making an intermediate announcement is 
delisted prior to the announcement date, resulting in 208 firms available for analysis. The 
wealth effects are estimated with net-of-market buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where 
the market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. The estimates are provided for three 
event windows: (-1,+1), (-5+5) and (-20,+20), where day zero is the date of the 
intermediate announcement of the restructuring as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the 
Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the 




     Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
Sample  (-1,+1)    (-5,+5)    (-20,+20) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample  [N=208] 
 
Mean   5.24%  (<.001)   6.80%  (<.001)   7.43%  (<.001) 
Median  2.20% (<.001)    3.33% (<.001)    4.37% (<.001) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Intermediate Announcement 
 
 
Acquisition Offer  9.86% (<.001)    12.31% (<.001)  14.54% (<.001) 
[N=96]    8.82%  (<.001)   10.42%  (<.001)  11.09%  (<.001) 
 
 
To Divest Unit  1.28% (0.106)   2.07% (0.157)   1.34% (0.415) 
[N=112]   0.54%  (0.096)   -0.15%    (0.827) 0.82%  (0.762) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 9. Wealth Effects at Event Completion Announcement. This table reports the 
wealth effects at the announcement of the completion of corporate restructuring. Panel A 
reports results for the full sample. Panel B reports results for the five categories of firms 
making event completion announcements. Sample formation and announcement 
categories are described in Table 4. Note that data are unavailable for 6 Bankrupt firms 
that delist before the bankruptcy announcement. The wealth effects are estimated with 
net-of-market buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the CRSP value-
weighted index. The estimates are provided for three event windows: (-1,+1), (-5+5) and 
(-20,+20), where day zero is the date of the initial announcement of the restructuring as 
determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are 
mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return 
equals zero) and median (p-value of a signed-rank test). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
Sample  (-1,+1)    (-5,+5)    (-20,+20) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample  [N=257]   
 
Mean    -3.77% (<.001)  -4.89%  (<.001)  -7.51% (<.001) 
Median  -0.64% (0.001)   -1.35% (0.001)  -2.61%  (0.001) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Event Completion 
 
No Longer for Sale  -10.77% (<.001)  -14.11% (<.001)  -20.43% (<.001) 
[N=36]      -7.21%  (<.001)  -11.22% (<.001)  -19.25% (<.001) 
 
 
Unsuccess Acquis  -12.05% (0.025)  -23.35% (0.006)  -29.15% (0.008) 
[N=15]      -10.04% (0.030)  -17.66% (0.001)  -28.28% (0.008) 
 
 
Acquired   0.64%  (0.472)   0.89%  (0.363)   -0.24%  (0.900) 
[N=84]    -0.13%  (0.849) 0.16%  (0.479)   -0.01%  (0.884) 
 
 
Divested Unit   0.26% (0.727)   0.32% (0.780)   -0.65% (0.693) 
[N=109]    -0.10% (0.551)  -0.92% (0.549)   -0.74% (0.419) 
 
 
Bankruptcy    -37.09% (0.003)  -39.15% (0.007)  -51.15% (0.006) 
[N=13]      -27.17% (0.002)  -30.03% (0.008)  -77.54% (0.010) 
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Table 10. Combined Wealth Effects for Initial and Intermediate Restructuring Announcements. This 
table reports the combined wealth effects for the initial and intermediate announcements of corporate 
restructuring for the firms that make both announcements. Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel 
B reports results for the four categories of initial announcements. Panel C reports the results for the two  
categories of intermediate announcements. Sample formation and announcement categories are described 
in Table 1 and Table 3. Note that one firm making an intermediate announcement is delisted prior to the 
announcement date, resulting in 208 firms available for analysis. The wealth effects are estimated with net-
of-market buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. The 
estimates are provided for three event windows: (-1,+1), (-5+5) and (-20,+20), where day zero is the 
announcement date as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are 
mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return equals zero) and 
median (p-value of a signed-rank test). 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
Sample    (-1,+1)    (-5,+5)    (-20,+20) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=208]   
 
Mean   12.82%  (<.001)   15.59%  (<.001)   16.18%  (<.001) 
Median   7.47%  (<.001)   10.66%  (<.001)   9.78%  (<.001) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Initial Announcement 
 
 
Prior Activity    17.43% (0.002)    20.85% (<.001)    22.20% (0.012) 
[N=22]    10.32%  (<.001)   18.42%  (<.001)   19.85%  (0.007) 
 
 
Possible Sale    24.46% (<.001)    29.57% (<.001)    31.11% (<.001) 
[N=57]    24.03%  (<.001)   24.85%  (<.001)   25.20%  (<.001) 
 
     
General Restructuring  11.68% (0.002)    15.01% (0.002)    17.47% (0.028) 
[N=46]    12.48%  (0.002)   17.58%  (0.002)   10.98%  (0.035) 
 
 
Specific Division   4.23% (<.001)    4.92% (0.002)    3.62% (0.181) 
[N=83]    2.50%  (<.001)   2.59%  (0.001)   2.26%  (0.209) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C. Categorized by Intermediate Announcement 
 
Acquisition Offer   22.50% (<.001)    28.28% (<.001)    31.41% (<.001) 
[N=96]    21.96%  (<.001)   24.21%  (<.001)   26.65%  (<.001) 
 
 
To Divest Unit    4.52% (0.001)    4.72% (0.024)    3.13% (0.288) 
[N=112]    2.89%  (<.001)   2.98%  (0.002)   1.10%  (0.367) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 11. Combined Wealth Effects for Initial, Intermediate, and Event Completion 
Announcements. This table reports the combined wealth effects for the three announcements of 
corporate restructuring. Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B reports results for the five 
categories of firms making event completion announcements. Sample formation and announcement 
categories are described in Tables 1, 3 and 4. Note that data are unavailable for 6 Bankrupt firms that delist 
before the bankruptcy announcement. For firms in the "no longer for sale" and "bankruptcy" categories, the 
estimates reflect only the Initial Announcement and Event Completion. The wealth effects are estimated 
with net-of-market buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the CRSP value-weighted 
index. The estimates are provided for three event windows: (-1,+1), (-5+5) and (-20,+20), where day zero is 
the announcement date as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics 
are mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return equals zero) 
and median (p-value of a signed-rank test). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
Sample  (-1,+1)    (-5,+5)    (-20,+20) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=257] 
 
Mean   7.32%  (<.001)   8.15%  (0.001)   5.19%  (0.108) 
Median  4.76% (<.001)   6.41% (<.001)   4.96% (0.018) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Event Completion 
 
 
No Longer for Sale  -4.39% (0.120)  -6.54% (0.124)  -9.92% (0.122) 
 [N=36]    -0.69% (0.386)   -1.43%  (0.353)   -6.31% (0.251) 
 
 
Unsuccess Acquis  12.66% (0.145)  0.53% (0.969)   -1.88% (0.909) 
[N=15]      11.15% (0.055)  9.24% (0.847)   0.52% (0.847)  
 
 
Acquired    21.85% (<.001)  29.47% (<.001)  30.13% (<.001) 
[N=84]      20.36% (<.001)  23.48% (<.001)  24.89% (<.001) 
 
 
Divested Unit   4.65% (0.002)   4.57% (0.060)   2.13% (0.552) 
[N=109]   3.12%  (<.001)   2.20%  (0.039)   0.27%  (0.664) 
 
 
Bankruptcy    -36.98% (0.024)  -49.28% (0.004)  -78.13% (0.005) 
[N=13]      -30.14% (0.040)  -50.66% (0.003)  -102.86% (0.005) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  